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Introduction 
 
Foreign policy has been integral for the successes of the United States of America. The 
United States’ “super power” status rests on the shoulders of a strong foreign policy – without 
linkage to the international community, the United States is an isolationist state, not a super 
power. The United States shows a history far from isolationism, but rather a history of foreign 
policy riddled with expansion. It can be said that even after Westward Expansion, the United 
States still looked to grow outward, and it did. 
Robert Kagan, a leading neoconservative and self described “liberal interventionist,” 
writes that United States history is essential in understanding foreign policy and interventionist 
politics. Far before the Cold War or the Reagan Administration, the United States sought to 
promote democracy around the globe. Kagan cites the Republican Party’s 1900 campaign 
platform, in which they congratulated themselves for America’s triumph and recent victory in the 
war in Spain. Kagan writes, “It was, they declared, a war fought for ‘high purpose,’ a ‘war for 
liberty and human rights’ that had given ‘ten millions of the human race’ a ‘new birth of 
freedom’ and the American people ‘a new and noble responsibility ... to confer the blessings of 
liberty and civilization upon all the rescued people.’”1 This new birth of freedom is the 
experience of democracy while the war fought for a high purpose – the liberation of Cuba from 
Spanish rule. In their eyes, the win was for American democracy and human rights. 
Kagan then moves deeper into history, going as far as the mid 19th century. He 
references William Henry Seward, the founder of the Republican Party, New York Governor, 
and future Secretary of State under Abraham Lincoln. As early as 1850, Seward “declared it 
America's duty ‘to renovate the condition of mankind’ and lead the way ‘to the universal 
                                               
1 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." World Affairs 170.4 (2008): 13-35. JSTOR. 
Web. 
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restoration of power to the governed.’”2 Seward is alluding to it being the responsibility of the 
United States of America to set the standard of global rights while influencing the international 
community. His use of “restoration of the power to the governed” is another way of stating that 
the United States must lead the international community in promoting democracy around the 
world. 
 It is clear, however, that this phenomenon was not limited to the 19th and 20th centuries 
as Kagan references the likes of Alexander Hamilton in the 18th century. Kagan writes that 
“Hamilton, even in the 1790s, looked forward to the day when America would be powerful 
enough to assist the ‘gloomy regions of despotism’ to rise up against the ‘tyrants’ that oppressed 
them.”3 Only twenty years after the inception of the United States of America as a country, its 
founders were imagining a future in which the United States would serve as a beacon of 
democracy for the rest of the world. Hamilton mentions “gloomy regions of despotism” and 
“tyrants” because they now represent the opposite of democracy, the very pillar of what their 
new country was founded on. 
 It would only make sense that a country that was founded on democratic principles would 
view these principles as central to the rights of the people who inhabited it. By escaping tyranny 
and being built as a democracy, the United States associated democracy with rights and 
monarchy as oppression. The new state would be free and focused on the promotion of liberty, a 
vast difference from pledging allegiance to a single ruler. In coming from tyranny and moving 
towards democracy, the United States understood that democracy was the truest, freest form of 
government that bestowed the most rights upon its citizens.  
                                               
2 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." 
3 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." 
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 Kagan argues that the United States then spent, up until the Iraq War, promoting 
democracy abroad. As early as World War I, the United States was fighting wars using the 
rhetoric of democracy. Kagan mentions Woodrow Wilson’s message to Congress in 1917: "The 
right is more precious than peace," he proclaimed, "and we shall fight for the things which we 
have always carried nearest our hearts," for "democracy" and against "selfish and autocratic 
power."4 The day had finally come when America was "privileged to spend her blood and her 
might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness."5 He then remarks that this is language 
that would make the speechwriters for President George W. Bush blush.  
 The Bush Administration fought the Iraq War in the name of democracy. The war was 
meant to help the people of Iraq by removing an abhorrent dictator from power while 
simultaneously giving the people agency by establishing a democracy. It was fought for human 
rights. But above all else, it was a neoconservative war. That is not to say the war was fought 
without good intentions – neoconservatives believed in the promotion of democracy because of 
its ability to stabilize the region, its benefits for the Iraqi people, but also its benefits for the 
United States of America.  
Neoconservatism has played an integral role in shaping American foreign policy since the 
start of the Reagan Administration, culminating with the Iraq War. This project examines 
neoconservatives and their relationship with human rights, particularly in regards to the Iraq 
War. By co-opting human rights language and creating a human rights policy that focused on the 
promotion of democracy, neoconservatives in the Bush Administration were ultimately able to 
start the war in Iraq. Their policy and focus were not new, as was their determination, but their 
rhetoric and capability was. With a love for democracy, a love for the United States Military, and 
                                               
4 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." 
5 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." 
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countless influence, neoconservatives started a war that would come to be considered as this 
generation's Vietnam.  
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1. Human Rights and Neoconservatism 
 
American Exceptionalism as Neoconservatism 
Neoconservatism is American exceptionalism, as outlined by Robert Kagan. It rests on 
the shoulders of foreign policy intertwined with American ideals, interests, and aspiration. As he 
writes, “The expansive, moralistic, militaristic tradition in American foreign policy is the hearty 
offspring of this marriage between Americans' driving ambitions and their overpowering sense 
of righteousness.”6 This overpowering sense of righteousness is a euphemism for American 
exceptionalism – the idea that the United States and its interests are more important than any 
other nation or governing body on the planet. By combining this righteousness with a driving 
ambition and a desire to build the nation’s military, Kagan argues that neoconservatism takes 
shape.  
 It is Michael McDonald who breaks down this relationship even further in his chapter 
titled, “What Were Neoconservatives Thinking?” He first writes that “America is exceptional for 
neoconservatives because the world needs American, and only American, values.”7 This plays 
closely with rhetoric surrounding American exceptionalism. At its heart, this exceptionalism is 
isolationist. There is an emphasis on American values, and only American values, as being a 
remedy for international issues. The next step in this order of logic focuses on how these values 
can be extended internationally, which is through a show of power. McDonald continues, 
writing, 
                                               
6 Kagan, Robert. "Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, C. 1776." World Affairs 170.4 (2008): 13-35. JSTOR. 
Web. 
7 MacDonald, Michael. Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2014. 
Print. 
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“American interests are embedded in its principles (and its principles are embedded in its 
power), and, as the second axiom provides, all countries benefit when America extends its 
principles (or its power).”8 Through this logic, the American exceptionalism that 
neoconservatives exude is beneficial for other nations. This affinity for American values, which 
directly benefit the United States, mixed with an extension of power, benefit the world. 
The values McDonald writes about and neoconservatives have such affection for are the 
democratic principles the United States was founded on. This is what makes the United States so 
special in neoconservative eyes. McDonald continues, writing through a neoconservative lens: 
“America is exceptional really because its principles coincide with and serve interests that are 
universal. By neoconservative accounts, all people benefit when American principles are 
exported.”9 Through this, it becomes clear that the exportation of American values is a 
promotion of democratic government. The United States enjoys the benefits of democracy, such 
as freedom and liberty, which serve these “universal interests.” Exporting these “universal 
interests” is democracy promotion.  
 
Elliott Abrams, Neoconservatism, and Human Rights through Reagan 
Neoconservatives were able to establish themselves in the American governmental sphere 
through intellect. Leaders were considered thoughtful intellectuals, not partisan hacks. There was 
no focus on party loyalty but rather a strong drive to create policy that would enforce American 
values. Brandon High writes in his “The Recent Historiography of Neoconservatives” that “the 
neoconservatives could never have sustained political careers without developing a network of 
                                               
8 MacDonald, Michael. Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq 
9 MacDonald, Michael. Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq 
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pressure groups and think-tanks. In this, neoconservatism was scarcely unique.”10 Through this 
strong commitment to policy and change, neoconservative thought became foreground to the 
Reagan Administration and central to anti-communist sentiment during the Cold War. 
 This commitment to policy is exactly what led to neoconservative thought becoming 
synonymous with the Republican Party during the late 1970’s and into the 1980’s. As High 
writes, “by the mid-1970s, the neoconservatives were not just becoming members of other 
people's committees, they were forming their own permanent think tanks.”11 This had a lasting 
effect. High continues, writing that “the neoconservatives (along with other groups with different 
objectives) not only forced the Republicans to engage in ideological warfare, but also became the 
first sizeable group in the history of the Republican party to have a vested interest in the 
production of ideas, as opposed to making money or soldiering.”12 
Neoconservatives rose to prominence during the Reagan Administration. Human rights 
had been pushed heavily under President Carter in the years before, yet Reagan’s Administration 
saw global human rights as an afterthought. With public pressure surrounding the 
Administration, President Reagan took significant steps to create the appearance that human 
rights was starting to take a top priority. A memo circulated through the State Department in 
1981 outlined a human rights strategy and its increasing role within the nation’s foreign policy. 
As written in The New York Times by Barbara Crossette, “the State Department says that the 
United States cannot hope to offer a credible alternative to either the Soviet example or what it 
sees as a rising tide of neutralism unless it takes a strong position on political freedom and civil 
                                               
10 High, Brandon. "The Recent Historiography Of American Neoconservatism*." The Historical Journal 52.02 
(2009): 475. Web. 
11 High, Brandon. "The Recent Historiography Of American Neoconservatism*." 
12 High, Brandon. "The Recent Historiography Of American Neoconservatism*." 
 
 
8 
 
rights.”13 As noted by Crossette, as the Cold War slowly moved along, the United States sought 
ways to better themselves in regards to public, international perception. One way was to distance 
themselves from their former “neutralist” approach to human rights and advocate for freedom 
and civil rights heavily.  
 This anti-Soviet sentiment went deeper than distancing, however. By first ridding 
themselves of neutralism, the Reagan Administration then sought to contrast the Soviet Union as 
opposite to these new rights-centered values. As Crossette writes, “The memorandum says that 
attempts to match or challenge Soviet military power must be complemented by efforts in 
international organizations to portray the Soviet Union as repressive and show its contrast to free 
societies.”14 Crossette then notes that written in the memorandum itself is the statement ''our 
ability to resist the Soviets around the world depends in part on our ability to draw this 
distinction and persuade others of it,''15 referring directly to this new difference. As Tamar 
Jacoby summarizes in her piece “The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights,” the memo 
“outlined a two-track human rights policy, a "positive" effort to expound democratic values and 
shame the Soviet Union, complemented by a "negative" policy of scolding both friends and 
adversaries for their serious abuses.”16 
 Abrams believed strongly in this “positive” strategy. He perceived human rights as 
positive because of its attachment to good morality – nations would view a foreign policy based 
on human rights as “positive.” He laid this out in his memo, stating, “Overall foreign policy, 
based on a strong human rights policy, will be perceived as a positive force for freedom and 
                                               
13 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." The New York Times. The New York Times, 04 Nov. 1981. Web. 
14 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." 
15 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." 
16 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights." Foreign Affairs 64.5 (1986): 1066. Web. 
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decency.”17  In order to win the Cold War, it was the United States job to win over public 
opinion by being this driving force of “freedom and decency,” the vessel being a foreign policy 
based on human rights values. This was again echoed as he wrote, “We seek to improve human 
rights performance wherever we reasonably can. We desire to demonstrate, by acting to defend 
liberty and identifying its enemies, that the difference between East and West is a crucial policy 
distinction of our times.”18 
What Crossette and Jacoby both note, is that “less than a week after the memo was 
circulated, the White House nominated [Elliott] Abrams to be assistant secretary for human 
rights.”19 This memorandum and policy shift placed a neoconservative in a high level state 
department post focusing on human rights. A neoconservative was now responsible for creating 
United States governmental human rights policy, shaping the way the Administration handled 
human rights. This would not be the last time neoconservatives and human rights would mix. 
Elliott Abrams was the first neoconservative, and the first member of the Reagan 
Administration, to care deeply and believe in the cause of human rights. At the same time, 
Abrams believed that a commitment to human rights was distinctly American. As Abrams wrote 
in his 1981 memo, “Human rights is at the core of our foreign policy because it is central to what 
America is and stands for.”20 Abrams was selected to be the Assistant Secretary of Human 
Rights for the Reagan Administration because of its shortcomings on human rights – the 
administration needed Abrams due to his core beliefs. He also happened to be a young and 
budding neoconservative.  
                                               
17 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." 
18 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." 
19 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights. 
20 Crossette, Barbara. "STRONG U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY URGED IN MEMO APPROVED BY 
HAIG." 
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 It is vital to distinguish whether or not Abrams believed in focusing on human rights as a 
method of combatting the Soviet Union, or because of his own humanitarian values. As Jacoby 
notes, “from the beginning, Abrams encouraged the President to use human rights as a rhetorical 
weapon against Moscow.”21 The Reagan Administration was determined to use human rights as 
a device to win domestic popular opinion, while simultaneously using rights language to shame 
the Soviet Union. Jacoby writes, “as his 1981 memo stated bluntly, the very purpose of a human 
rights policy should be to convey to the public, at home and in Europe, just what the difference 
was between East and West.”22 The East was determined to fight for the rights of the oppressed, 
using freedom and democracy, while the West would continue to oppress, using communism as 
an anchor. 
 While it is clear human rights were being used against the Soviet Union, Elliott Abrams 
very much embraced human rights. Jacoby writes that as the years progressed, Abrams views on 
human rights progressed as well. “‘It is not enough,’ Abrams told a reporter in 1982, ‘to ask who 
is in power and what is he like. We also have to ask what is the alternative, what are the likely 
prospects for improvement.’”23 Abrams was concerned with developing nations and promoting 
democracy – something fighting the Cold War had taught him how to do well. Jacoby continues, 
writing that “by December 1983 he was even more explicit, noting in a speech delivered in New 
York that human rights are ‘not a free-floating goal to be considered in isolation each morning. 
We do not betray the cause of human rights when we make prudential judgments about what can 
and can't be done in one place at one time.’”24 In other words, human rights were often carefully 
                                               
21 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights. 
22 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights. 
23 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights. 
24 Jacoby, Tamar. "The Reagan Turnaround on Human Rights. 
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considered in many different situations. Elliott Abrams was a neoconservative who deeply cared 
about human rights. 
 The Reagan Administration used this East versus West human rights foreign policy while 
backing the El Salvadoran government against communist rebels during the late 1980’s. During 
this time, the Salvadoran government was accused of committing various atrocities and war 
crimes, such as the massacre at El Mozote. Abrams however, the Assistant Secretary of Human 
Rights for the US government, believed that these small violations were worth it, as a communist 
takeover of El Salvador would be even worse. As Mark Danner writes in his book The Massacre 
at El Mozote, “Abrams stood the human-rights argument on its head, contending that to argue for 
an aid cutoff was, in effect, to argue for a guerrilla victory, and that at the end of the day, 
however badly the Salvadoran government behaved, those collective atrocities could never 
approach the general disaster for human rights that an F.M.L.N. victory would represent.”25 In 
his eyes, a democratic government, no matter how imperfect or violent, would always respect 
human rights more than a communist regime.  
 This is how neoconservatives were able to approach human rights – it wasn’t about the 
small violations but part of a much larger picture. Human rights for them is the security of 
democracy, liberty, and freedom. Establishing or protecting a community with these values was 
invaluable, especially at a time in which Americans believed communism threatened the sanctity 
and sovereignty of their nation. Nothing, not even the massacre of over 900 civilians, as the 
massacre at El Mozote was, could compare to the abuses that would be committed under a 
repressive communist government. Such was the Latin American foreign policy under the 
Reagan Administration – from the rebel contras in Nicaragua to the military coup d’etat led by 
                                               
25 Danner, Mark. The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War. London: Granta, 2005. Print. 
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Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Each was in the name of the promotion of American values in 
foreign nations, and each led to war crimes or the disappearances of civilians.  
 It is important to note that Elliott Abrams was later confirmed as the Assistant Secretary 
of State during the second term of the Reagan Administration. He was subsequently involved in 
the Iran - Contra affair, in which members of the United States government were charged with 
illegally selling arms to Iran in order to fund rebels fighting in Nicaragua. Abrams was facing 
several felony charges but instead pleaded guilty to two counts of withholding information from 
congress, misdemeanors. He was sentenced to two years probation and 100 hours of community 
service. Then, in 1992, he was pardoned by then President George H. W. Bush. In June of 2001, 
“National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice announced today the appointment of Elliott 
Abrams as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, 
and International Operations at the National Security Council.”26  
 
The Kirkpatrick Doctrine 
Another key role player in this neoconservative human rights revolution was Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, a foreign policy advisor for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and then his Ambassador to the 
United Nations. Kirkpatrick won the favor of Reagan with her 1979 essay titled “Dictatorships 
and Double Standards,” in which she criticized the Carter Administration’s foreign policy while 
simultaneously arguing for the liberalization of authoritarian regimes in order to fight 
encroaching communism and socialism. In keeping with neoconservative human rights ideology, 
she wrote, “although most governments in the world are, as they always have been, autocracies 
of one kind or another, no idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the 
                                               
26 "Statement by the Press Secretary." National Archives and Records Administration. National Archives and 
Records Administration, 2 Dec. 2002. Web. 
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belief that it is possible to democratize governments, anytime, anywhere, under any 
circumstances.”27 It was her personal belief that allying with authoritarian regimes with 
democratization in mind, the Unite28d States would be able to fight communism. Her 1979 essay 
came to be known as the “Kirkpatrick Doctrine,” and heavily influenced the foreign policy of the 
Reagan Administration. 
Jerome J. Shestack places Kirkpatrick’s argument as a discussion surrounding national 
security in his piece “Human Rights, the National Interest, and U. S. Foreign Policy.” Shestack 
writes that Kirkpatrick believed “that national security interests required alliances with any state 
that was adverse to the Soviet Union,” keeping with the East vs. West dichotomy. Shestack 
agrees that national security interests trump human rights in times of peril but regards 
Kirkpatrick’s view as extreme.  
Kirkpatrick’s foreign policy can be broken down to a “totalitarian-authoritarian model.” 
In this model, “Communist regimes were totalitarian and hostile, and their abuses were decried. 
Anti-Communist regimes were authoritarian and friendly; they were to be supported 
economically and militarily, and their human rights abuses were to be downplayed,”29 writes 
Shestack. This shows immediate preference for authoritarian regimes and their ability to be 
liberalized. In Kirkpatrick’s eyes, it is possible to influence an authoritarian regime to adopt 
policies that center around freedom – a form of human rights for her. For communist regimes, 
this is impossible. 
Shestack dives deeper into what Kirkpatrick believes is the prime objective for 
governments, especially that of the United States. He goes on to write that Kirkpatrick believed 
                                               
27 Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. "Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics." Foreign 
Affairs 61.1 (1982): 219. Web. 
28 Shestack, Jerome J. "Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy." The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 506 (1989): 17-29.JSTOR. Web. 
29 Shestack, Jerome J. "Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy." 
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that “a government's primary moral and political duty is to prevail in the struggle of us – the 
good – against them – the evil. In that struggle, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”30 In her 
eyes, the United States primary moral and political duty is to prevail in the fight against 
communism. To do this, it was necessary to back regimes who shared the same duty. For the 
United States, the fight against the Soviet Union was fought in battles across Latin and South 
America, in the form of backing specific groups that held one main vital US interest, no matter 
their human rights record – they were anti-communist.  
 
Post Cold War Neoconservatism 
 With the end of the Cold War came the end of the communist threat. The United States 
had effectively bankrupted the Soviet Union, leading to its dissolution. The West had won its 
fight against the East, marking a time for a new foreign policy. Here, is where neoconservatives 
split. The neoconservative mission had been to fight the spread of communism, yet 
neoconservatives had spent much less time creating post-Cold War foreign policy. David 
Hoogland Noon writes that the neoconservative movement split into two camps with the fall of 
the Soviet Union: “Some argued that a narrower definition of the national interest best suited the 
new times. Others saw an opportunity, with the Soviets gone, to spread American influence 
across the globe in the form of crusades for democracy.”31 Older neoconservatives believed that 
with communism defeated, it was most beneficial for the United States to shrink its definition of 
national interest. For decades the United States had been fighting the Soviet Union through 
spreading American values abroad. With the threat of the Soviet Union gone, older 
neoconservatives believed this was no longer necessary. One neoconservative who held this 
                                               
30 Shestack, Jerome J. "Human Rights, the National Interest, and U.S. Foreign Policy." 
31 Noon, David Hoogland. "Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on 
Terror." American Studies 48.3 (2007): 75-99. Web. 
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thought was Jeane Kirkpatrick, who said the United States could now be a “normal country in a 
normal time.” Through her and the older generation of neoconservatives eyes, the United States 
had won. It was time for the nation to focus on American issues, reverting away from attaching 
to foreign countries or playing world police. 
 The younger generation, made up of neoconservatives such as Elliott Abrams, Paul 
Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol, disagreed heavily with this notion. Noon writes 
that “they believed that with the Soviet Union out of the way, the US was free to actively spread 
its own democratic values around the world.”32 These neoconservatives believed that it was the 
responsibility of the United States to make the world a better place by continuing to promote 
American values abroad. Noon makes note of writing by Robert Kagan, which states that it was 
imperative to build “upon the successes of the cold war to create a permanent ‘benevolent 
domination’—in other words, world hegemony.”33 A world led by the United States would be a 
world that reveled in democracy and freedom, thereby a world that advocated and enforced 
human rights values. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was no reason to withdraw from the 
human rights and foreign policy set by the Reagan Administration. If anything, it was a reason to 
continue promoting democracy throughout the world. 
 It is important to note that the belief that it is the responsibility of the United States of 
America to lead the world comes from the notion that it is the only remaining superpower after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States is in this position because of the global power 
they hold. Neoconservatives believed that it was more important to use this power to influence 
the world than it was to sit back and leave the world to their own devices.  
                                               
32 Noon, David Hoogland. "Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on 
Terror." 
33 Noon, David Hoogland. "Cold War Revival: Neoconservatives and Historical Memory in the War on 
Terror." 
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 This sentiment was highly echoed in a piece written by Robert Kagan and William 
Kristol in Foreign Affairs magazine, published in 1996. The piece, titled “Toward a Neo-
Reaganite Foreign Policy” was focused on laying claim to America’s role as benevolent 
dominator of the world. It was a direct response to perceived foreign policy complacency after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. First, it lampooned foreign policy under the Reagan Administration 
by recognizing the policies that were used to spar with the Soviets, such as “large increases in 
defense spending, resistance to communist advances in the Third World, and greater moral 
clarity and purpose in U.S. foreign policy.”34 This “greater moral clarity and purpose” is 
referring to an emphasis on human rights. In the eyes of Kagan and Kristol, the Reagan 
Administration’s foreign policy focused on moral issues – language that often finds itself 
surrounded around human rights. Kagan and Kristol particularly highlight that Reagan “refused 
to accept the limits on American power imposed by the domestic political realities that others 
assumed were fixed.”35 For them, this refusal to accept the limits of American power is 
intertwined with human rights, as it is involved with the spreading of American values. What 
was so fantastic about the Reagan Administration was their ability to spread American beliefs 
and morals throughout the globe. 
For Kristol and Kagan, securing global hegemony was based upon the moral confidence 
of the United States, combined with increased defense spending and a larger military. By their 
view, human rights was dependent on military strength. By creating a vast and expansive 
military, the largest in the world, to secure complete global power, the United States would be 
able to enforce their moral character and spread democracy. As they write, “The appropriate goal 
of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as 
                                               
34 Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 75.4 
(1996): 18. Web. 
35 Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy."  
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possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo Reaganite foreign policy of military 
supremacy and moral confidence.”36 Kristol and Kagan are arguing that it is beneficial for the 
world as a whole for the United States to be leaders of this “benevolent hegemony” and to 
“preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible.” Preserving this hegemony leads to 
less human rights abuses over a longer period of time, something that would be beneficial for the 
United States and the globe as a whole.  
Kagan and Kristol also seek to define the relationship between American moral goals and 
fundamental national interests. This can be characterized by the policy of democracy promotion. 
Foreign policy in regards to American morality is the promotion of Democratic principles 
worldwide. National interests in regards to foreign policy are one in the same, as creating stable 
democratic governments benefit the United States. This is directly spelled out, as they write, 
“The United States achieved its present position of strength not by practicing a foreign policy of 
live and let live, nor by passively waiting for threats to arise, but by actively promoting 
American principles of governance abroad – democracy, free markets, respect for liberty.”37 This 
reasoning is exactly why the United States is the perfect fit for global leader. The United States 
of America is the world’s only superpower because it actively promoted American principles and 
values abroad. It is also important to note their use of the word “threats.” For Kristol and Kagan, 
threats to American society are the same battles fought in Latin America. To them, the foreign 
policy of the Reagan Administration prevented such threats from harming the United States, or 
the world.  
Kagan and Kristol then make a direct appeal for global security and human rights. In 
doing so, they first acknowledge conservatives tendency to revert back to America as being a 
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“city on a hill.” They also invoke John Quincy Adams, stating that conservatives align with the 
saying that the United States should not go "abroad in search of monsters to destroy."38 Kagan 
and Kristol respond, writing, “But why not? The alternative is to leave monsters on the loose, 
ravaging and pillaging to their heart’s content, as Americans stand by and watch.”39 Kristol and 
Kagan are directly advocating for the Unites States to become the world’s leading global power 
in the name of protecting human rights. They argue for American intervention because of this 
same American moral character. It is the duty of the United States to continue to prevent the 
spread of ideology or regimes that purport ideology that directly conflicts with American 
principles. These so called “monsters” violate human rights, and should be stopped. It is better 
for the world for the United States to be at the helm. Kagan and Kristol take it one step further, 
writing that  “a policy of sitting atop a hill and leading by example becomes in practice a policy 
of cowardice and dishonor.”40 With the United States’s power, it would be cowardly and 
dishonorable to not lead the world and protect it from harmful ideology or abuses. In order to be 
the city atop the hill, the United States needs to enforce beliefs around the world that put the 
United States at the top of the hill in the first place.  
Robert Kagan and William Kristol would go on to form Project for a New American 
Century, a neoconservative think tank based in Washington D.C. Their essay, “Toward a Neo-
Reaganite Foreign Policy,” was the basis for this group, which centered around creating United 
States foreign policy. Project For a New American Century frequently advocated for the removal 
of Saddam Hussein from power and included members such as Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney, 
Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz. These characters would actively pursue a neo-Reaganite 
foreign policy not too far into the future. 
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From the late 1970’s leading up until the 1990’s, neoconservatives dominated United 
States foreign policy decisions. Their time can be characterized by aggressive expansionism and 
global democracy promotion, centered around the notion that to live in a democratic country is to 
participate in positive human rights discourse. Their human rights policy was largely focused on 
deterring Soviet and communist development, and containing the threat to the eastern 
hemisphere. In doing so, the United States saw human rights as a long term investment, choosing 
to back authoritarian regimes with poor human rights records in order to promote democratic 
principles, regarding this as better for human rights overall compared to a communistic takeover.  
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2. Neoconservative Human Rights and the Iraq War 
 
Democracy as Human Rights 
 
 A definition of human rights that focuses on the exceptionalism of specific populations 
or, more extreme, ideas is often excluded in the academic understanding of universal human 
rights. The post-9/11 neoconservative definition of human rights, rather, flips accepted rights 
language on its head. American neoconservatives coopted universal human rights discourse to 
further an American political agenda. Their influence on the Bush Administration started the Iraq 
War by veiling the promotion of American democracy in human rights language and extreme 
attention to American exceptionalism.  
 Nicolas Guilhot, a political scientist, writes on the neoconservative definition of human 
rights in his article titled “Limiting Sovereignty or Producing Governmentality? Two Human 
Rights Regimes in U.S. Political Discourse” in which he separates neoconservative thought from 
the widely accepted, unilateral definition of human rights. In this separation, Guilhot discovers 
the origins of American exceptionalism as well as outlines the process that leads to the 
promotion of democracy internationally – the ultimate American human rights policy. 
 Guilhot first differentiates between neoconservative thought and universal human rights 
by observing international law. He makes the claim that international law is widely thought to be 
the foundation of universal human rights; however, neoconservative thought disagrees. “This 
[neoconservative] discourse is also an explicit critique of legalistic understandings of human 
rights. It constantly mobilizes realist critiques of legal formalism to emphasize the legal deficit of 
international law and to extend it to human rights,”41 writes Guilhot, expressing the 
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aforementioned contempt for international law practice. Guilhot remarks that this contempt is 
then transferred to human rights, as neoconservatives embrace the “legal deficit.” But what 
exactly is this legal deficit? In neoconservative eyes, international law can only be enforced if 
countries are willing to participate. Guilhot continues, “‘the content of international law is 
uncertain,’ as Joshua Muravchik writes. At that level, legal validity is entirely dependent upon 
the consent of those who recognize it: in other words, international law is hardly law. At best, it 
is a ‘positive international morality.’”42 This mention of “consent” creates the notion of at least 
two parties, willing and able to participate in legal discourse. These two parties, or states, must 
both acknowledge the presence of international law for it to be binding. A simple refusal to obey 
international law unhinges the structure upon which it stands – creating an international morality 
or stringent set of values. These values are then obeyed by some, but not all. Neoconservative 
discourse pins this argument against international law and then transfers it to human rights. If 
international law can be described as a “positive international morality,” so can human rights. 
 In separating human rights from international law, however, universality is destroyed. 
Rather than come from an international, unified body designated to enforce natural rights, these 
rights must now come from and be enforced by the state. As Guilhot notes, “the existence of 
rights is tightly subordinated to a pre-existing political community. Human rights are not formal 
declarations or international treaties: they essentially designate specific forms of political 
organization that characterize primarily Western democracies.”43 Rights, in this context, are not 
innate nor bound by laws; rather, they are tied to specific social normalities. Human rights 
“define routinized social practices.”44  
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An exclusion of international binding directly characterizes the human rights policy of 
the American government. The United States repeatedly refuses to prescribe to this “pre-existing 
political community” as it relates to human rights. For example, the Law of the Sea Treaty, 
which has been ratified by 161 parties and governs international waterways, has not been ratified 
by the United States of America. Among others include the treaty forming the International 
Criminal Court, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.45 The failure to ratify these treaties 
and covenants are characterized by a direct rebuttal to international bodies holding power over 
the United States of America. These treaties, which represent solutions to issues important to the 
international community as well as the United States, are seen as an encroachment on American 
sovereignty. In rejecting these forms of international human rights, American citizens rights are 
upheld through the state government.  
 According to Guilhot, there are two resulting consequences. First, human rights are 
equated to state power. In such system, “the defence of the national interest of democracies is not 
only compatible, but also equivalent to the defence of human rights.” Secondly, “human rights 
cannot be politically or ideologically neutral.”46 Because human rights are not a policy supported 
by international law, they become a policy that supports democratic governance. This leads to a 
singular form of human rights in Guilhot’s eyes: A human rights policy can only be a policy of 
democracy promotion.47 
 Democracy promotion manifested itself in neoconservative thought through the 
formation of Project for a New American Century in 1997 – a collective made up of influential, 
high-ranking neoconservative political thinkers. Members included Elliott Abrams, Paul 
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Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld among others. In their statement of principles, 
the project called for a revitalization of the American military and to enforcing democracy 
promotion as a governmental foreign policy. In a small bid for human rights, they wrote, “We 
need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad.”48 This idea of political 
and economic freedom embodies the core of human rights for neoconservatives. In their eyes, 
economic freedom adhered to laissez-faire and neoliberal principles while political freedom was 
represented by free and democratic elections. Without making a direct call to protecting human 
rights of those across the globe, the Project for a New American Century made it clear that they 
believed in the protection of Western values. 
A year later, a similar group with the same core members was founded as the Committee 
for Peace and Security in the Gulf. The mission of the group was to promote the stabilization of 
the Middle East. The way to do this, according to the Committee, was to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power. On February 19, 1998, the Committee sent an open letter to President 
Clinton, urging him to take action against Saddam Hussein because of his threat to national 
security, with specific note of his ability “to develop biological and chemical munitions.”49 The 
letter also mentioned Hussein’s willingness to use these munitions “against his own people,”50 
once again calling to human rights in an indirect manner. While President Clinton may not have 
acted in the interests of the Committee, the election of President George W. Bush and a post-9/11 
America saw many changes to political and foreign policy that did. 
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Human Rights in the Bush Administration 
Professor Mary Stuckey and Joshua Ritter echo Guilhot in their piece “George Bush, 
Human Rights, and American Democracy.” Together, they connect the Bush Administration and 
human rights, finding ties to neoliberalism and neoconservatism. They write, “Neoliberal and 
neoconservative conceptions of ‘democracy’ are thus inherently tied to how human rights 
function in Bush's discourse; that is, market fundamentalism and neoliberal orthodoxy are the 
‘democratic’ freedoms and rights to which Bush refers, and these rights become debased into the 
freedom to consume under the veneer of a certain ‘moral’ order.”51 Stuckey’s democratic rights 
and freedoms are Guilhot’s consequences. This “‘moral’ order” Stuckey refers to are the 
“routinized social practices.” Therefore, human rights, under the Bush Administration, are 
distinctly different from international human rights. American human rights such as “market 
fundamentalism and neoliberal orthodoxy” are specific to American citizens, not the 
international community. Through this process of the breakdown of international law as well as 
the equation of human rights with state power, the only place this version of human rights can 
then go is outward. 
 Stuckey and Ritter accent Guilhot perfectly through their depiction of the relationship 
between neoconservatives and human rights. Playing deeper into the idea of moral values, they 
write, “Neoconservatives desire to restore a sense of moral purpose to society by a type of ‘social 
control through construction of a climate of consent around a coherent set of moral values.’”52 It 
becomes clear that the human rights definition for neoconservatives is based on social 
interaction, and how governing bodies and states are supposed to interact with one another. 
Again there is a focus on consent regarding rights – implying that two or more parties must be 
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privy to the concept of rights coming from the international community. Without this 
compliance, as noted before, rights come from the state. Instead of consenting to an international 
human rights agenda, neoconservatives seek to create a climate of consent of the American 
people around a “coherent set of moral values” in order to create American “human rights.”  
Interestingly, Stuckey and Ritter also outline the relationship between neoconservative 
human rights and what they call “military humanism.” They first describe the effect 
neoliberalism has on human rights, writing, “Human rights function within neoconservative 
discourse as a powerful example of what must occur rhetorically in order for neoliberal ideology 
to remain effective.”53 This creates the notion that the sole purpose of neoconservative human 
rights is to create a space in which neoliberalism can flourish. For instance, creating a 
democracy. In creating this space, “a set of ‘moral’ values is rhetorically constructed around 
neoliberal ideology in an attempt to bring order to the chaos that is actually created by 
neoliberalism. These moral values, incidentally, also serve to justify any military interventions as 
‘military humanism.’”54 These moral values are neoconservative human rights. 
Under the Bush Administration, groups like the Project for a New American Century and 
Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf were dominant – many members received policy 
positions within the administration. Stuckey and Ritter write that “From the early days of his 
administration, Bush offered the promise that ‘the United States will continue to stand for greater 
consolidation of pluralism and religious freedom, wider access to information, and respect for 
human rights and for the rule of law.’”55 This promise, one can argue, can be attributed to a letter 
written by two dozen leading conservatives, including Elliott Abrams, to President Bush in 
January of 2001. The letter urged President Bush to adopt a strong human rights policy and 
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provided advice on how to do so: “American leadership must never remain indifferent to 
tyranny, must never be agnostic about the virtues of political and economic freedom, must 
always be concerned with the fortunes of fragile democracies.”56 Here again is the language of 
“political and economic freedom,” centerfold of the neoconservative human rights discourse. 
Less subtle, however, is Abrams’s focus on “fragile democracies,” directly opposite his use of 
the word “tyranny.” In this letter, Abrams is asking President Bush to openly admonish those 
who oppose American values while helping those who share “political and economic freedoms.”  
Similar to the letters from Project for a New American Century and Committee for Peace 
and Security in the Gulf, the correspondence between Abrams and President Bush promoted the 
perspective of America as the largest, most powerful nation in the world with a duty to spread 
democracy and prevent harm to other smaller nations.  
 
Post 9/11 Human Rights Rhetoric 
Human rights rhetoric, however, changed in American governmental policy after 9/11. 
Rather than seeing the attacks on September 11th as a continuation of violence and 
destabilization in the Middle East that had tortured the region for decades, the Bush 
Administration saw 9/11 as a human rights abuse. As President Bush himself said, “The terrible 
tragedies of September 11 served as a grievous reminder that the enemies of freedom do not 
respect or value individual human rights. Their brutal attacks were an attack on these very 
rights.”57 In this respect, human rights became a battle for freedom against those who sought to 
strip it from the American people. President Bush characterized the events after 9/11, including 
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the War on Terror, as a battle between “freedom” and “fear ” — freedom being the United States 
and human rights; fear being the generic “terrorist.” 
 There is specific evidence of President Bush alluding to this, as freedom played a key 
role in his presidential discourse. The President’s 2006 Proclamation on Human Rights Day, Bill 
of Rights Day, and Human Rights week stated, “The advance of freedom is the story of our time, 
and new chapters are being written before our eyes. Around the world, freedom is replacing 
tyranny and giving men and women the opportunity to enjoy lives of purpose and dignity.”58 
Here, President Bush determines that living with “purpose and dignity” means living in a 
democracy. In order to experience a life characterized by “purpose and dignity”, individuals 
must live in a society characterized by freedom and liberty. He continues, “Because Americans 
are committed to the God-given value of every life, we cherish the freedom of every person in 
every nation and strive to promote respect for human rights.”59 As Americans, President Bush 
purports, we are exceptional and must promote human rights where they are not enforced – 
countries which are not democracies. 
 Iraq in 2003 was undeniably encountering a humanitarian crisis. The practices of the 
Saddam regime were brutal and inhumane, such as political assassinations and disappearances. 
Additionally, foreign conflicts leading up to the War in Iraq played a significant role as well. “A 
2003 UN report noted that “the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War and sanctions took a heavy toll on 
the health and education sectors, which had previously been among the best developed in the 
region”60. Earthquakes, floods, and droughts also contributed to the upheaval and displacement 
of Iraqi civilians.  
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While the United States spearheaded the campaign in Iraq, the United Nations passed 
Resolution 1511 in October 2003 unanimously, urging countries to contribute to a multinational 
force committed to deposing Saddam Hussein and returning power to the Iraqi people. In a short 
statement to the American people, President Bush said, “The world has an opportunity — and a 
responsibility — to help the Iraqi people build a nation that is stable, secure, and free. This 
resolution will help marshal even more international support for the development of a new, 
democratic Iraq.”61 It was one year earlier, however, in which President Bush outlined his plan 
for combatting those who opposed America and Western ideals. 
 
Analyzing the 2002 State of the Union Address 
In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush unveiled his infamous “Axis of 
Evil,” a grouping of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. It was asserted that these states were in 
possession of or trying to possess weapons of mass destruction. What made the state of Iraq 
“evil” was its continual flaunting of hostility towards America and its support of terror. In her 
book, Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States, Dianne 
Pfundstein Chamberlain posits that this branding was a part of a preemptive policy, created in 
order to protect Americans from foreign threats. Examining the State of the Union, Chamberlain 
writes, “Bush asserted that ‘the United States of America will not permit the world’s most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. . . . We are 
protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home.’”62 It is 
this language that links security to human rights.  
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Bush used thinly veiled human rights rhetoric of words such as “protection” to create a 
preemptive human rights, not security, agenda. In a world that saw the September 11 attacks as 
an attack on American sovereignty, values, and rights, Bush’s preemptive human rights agenda 
sought to prevent such an attack from happening ever again. The prevention of another wide 
scale attack on American culture became the focal point for domestic human rights policy. By 
preemptively engaging with Iraq, American rights would not be threatened. The policy, however, 
would be characterized by “vigorous action abroad,” as well as “increased vigilance.”63 Later in 
the address, President Bush is seen using another instance of “protection.” A large priority, he 
states, “is to do everything possible to protect our citizens and strengthen our nation against the 
ongoing threat of another attack.”64  
A direct absorption of human rights language comes later in the address, as President 
Bush makes the statement that in the coming years, “America will lead by defending liberty and 
justice because they are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.”65 Here, 
President Bush uses universality to create a bridge between American and Iraqi citizens. His use 
of the word “everywhere” is meant to support inclusion, especially in regards to the Iraqi people. 
By “defending liberty and justice,” President Bush imagines that the American government will 
be defending human rights in Iraq. Liberty and justice represent the opposite of the Hussein 
regime in neoconservative eyes. What “liberty and justice” does represent is democracy. 
President Bush takes his statements one step further, claiming the rights that America 
stands for. He says, “America will always stand firm for the non-negotiable demands of human 
dignity: the rule of law; limits on the power of the state; respect for women; private property; 
free speech; equal justice; and religious tolerance.” Again, in claiming that America stands firm 
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for these values, President Bush is stating that these values represent democracy. In order to 
spread these values, the United States of America must spread democracy.  
On top of this, however, President Bush made sure to include human rights abuses 
purported by the Iraqi government. He went on, saying that Iraq was “a regime that has already 
used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled 
over their dead children.”66 The imagery used by the Bush Administration was meant to tap into 
the hearts of American citizens. “Mothers huddled over their dead children” would evoke 
empathy in the American public and would create a conversation around our duty to put an end 
to atrocities happening in the Middle East – specifically those carried out by Saddam Hussein. 
The Bush Administration uses the language of “mothers” in a gendered approach as well. As an 
appeal to the American public, President Bush used the imagery of “mothers,” something the 
American public would be familiar with. Rather than just exclaim that human rights had been 
violated with the murder of Iraqi citizens, President Bush brought in familiarity and horror in his 
address. In this vein, Saddam Hussein was not only threatening the human rights of Iraqi 
citizens, but was continually threatening the human rights of American citizens as well. 
 
Starting the War 
Stuckey and Ritter argue that President Bush was able to use human rights discourse such 
as this to further an agenda ultimately subverted by the same language. The administration’s 
emphasis on the rights of the Iraqi people as reason for starting the Iraq War is paradoxical to 
Stuckey and Ritter due to the war instead leading to horrific human rights abuses led by the 
American government. As Stuckey and Ritter write, “American military power was used only to 
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support its neoconservative mission, which was the defense of neoliberalism, under the guise of 
international human rights.”67 
 Jonathan Horowitz takes this one step further in his book Understanding the U.S. Wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. In a chapter titled “Human Rights as a Weapon of War,” Horowitz makes 
the claim that the Bush Administration weaponized human rights to their benefit, ultimately 
creating the War in Iraq, using human rights to influence public and political opinion.  
First, Horowitz notes, the Bush Administration made the claim that Saddam Hussein had 
access to weapons of mass destruction. In this hands, the administration argued that democratic 
allies in the Middle East, as well as American national security would be put at severe risk. On 
this basis, it was an American moral obligation to prevent a devastating attack from the Iraqi 
regime. Horowitz writes, “the administration layered the incontestable facts of Saddam 
Hussein’s human rights abuses to depict the president as a tyrant with no regard for humanity, 
one whose removal from power would benefit not only the Iraqi people but also the world at 
large.”68 In removing Saddam Hussein from power, the United States would avert possible 
nuclear disaster. Of course it was later discovered that Iraq was never in possession of weapons 
of mass destruction and the claims were largely discredited. 
Second, the Bush Administration asserted that there were ties between the Iraqi regime 
and Al-Qaeda. In invoking Al-Qaeda — the terrorist group responsible for the attacks on 
September 11, 2001 — the administration tapped into public fear that Americans were not safe in 
their own homes. It also created the idea that the United States would be able to bring those who 
carried out the attacks to justice. Reports that Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime had ties were also 
discredited as false. 
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The Bush Administration also used vivid descriptions of abuses in order to explain to the 
American public that it was the United States duty to intervene in Iraq. In recounting human 
rights abuses carried out by Saddam’s regime, President Bush said in a radio address that 
“dissidents in Iraq are tortured, imprisoned, and sometimes just disappear; their hands, feet, and 
tongues are cut off; their eyes are gouged out; and female relatives are raped in their presence.”69 
In prefacing this statement, President Bush claimed how he had learned of these abuses. “We 
know from human rights groups,”70 he stated. 
 As another strategy method, the United States used relief efforts as an active 
counterinsurgency tool. Instead of using relief efforts to provide a positive quality of life for Iraqi 
civilians, the United States government used it as a tactic to garner Iraqi support. The 2006 Army 
Field Manual on Counterinsurgency went as far to say that to gain support the American Military 
had to “defeat insurgents or render them irrelevant, uphold the rule of law, and provide a basic 
level of essential services and security for the populace.”71 This focus on providing a basic level 
of essential services was a thin veil of human rights used to further the American political 
agenda. 
The United States relief efforts included congressionally funded programs such as the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq 
Freedom Fund, and the Commander’s Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program funds. 
Such projects would be tasked with “repairing public buildings, clearing roadways, and 
providing needed supplies to hospitals and schools.”72 This was all championed under the “hearts 
and minds” campaign, set at winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people.  
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Reflection 
With the drastic implications of the Iraq War affecting the region today, it is easy to look 
at the Iraq War as a disastrous mistake made by the American government. At the same time, 
however, it is clear that Iraqi opposition leaders were calling for international intervention in the 
hopes that Saddam Hussein would be ousted from power.  As Ahmed Chalabi writes, 
“Personalities whose political record is replete with anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist acts call 
for further international intervention in Iraq usually under the guise of UN action. Iraqi patriots 
welcome the sight and sound of foreign fighter aircraft flying over their country.”73 Chalabi was 
an Iraqi political figure who led the purge of Saddam’s regime and provided the United States 
with intelligence documents. 
 Chalabi also makes a call for an establishment of human rights. His piece, Opposing 
Saddam Hussein, is cry for help from the international community. Saddam Hussein, he argues, 
is destroying the country through his “bloodthirsty” regime. His piece, which was written in the 
mid 90’s, can be seen almost as a premonition for what the Bush Administration hoped to 
establish. “Looking into the future,” he writes, “the people of Iraq are seeking a democratic, 
constitutional, parliamentary and pluralistic system, guaranteeing human rights within a federal 
structure as a formula for the Iraqi state.”74 It is this vision the Bush Administration hoped to 
create with the invasion in 2003 - a free Iraqi state. 
 It is often overlooked how reviled of a dictator Saddam Hussein was. In an obituary by 
the New York Times, Neil MacFarquhar wrote, “The despot, known as Saddam, had oppressed 
Iraq for more than 30 years, unleashing devastating regional wars and reducing his once 
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promising, oil-rich nation to a claustrophobic police state.”75 There is no doubt that Saddam 
Hussein ruled brutally and vastly harmed the people he ruled over. 
 While many parties opposed Saddam’s rule, a large amount of Iraqi civilians might not 
have called for intervention from the international community. Information and requests for help 
from opposition parties were enough for the Bush Administration to believe something had to be 
done the Iraqi people. Once again, it was the administration’s belief they had a moral obligation 
to help those who were suffering. 
It is also important to remember, however, that neoconservatives succeeded in creating a 
war that would last for over a decade, killing thousands of American troops, and hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi civilians. As Muhammad Idrees Ahmad writes in his book, Road to Iraq, “the 
neoconservatives succeeded because they operate within a political consensus that sees US 
global dominance as the desired end and military force as the necessary, if not preferred, 
means.”76 This would ultimately shape United States foreign policy for the entirety of the Bush 
Administration — a total of 8 years. 
All in all, the Bush Administration used human rights as means to achieve political gains 
and assert the United States as the leader of freedom and democracy. Stuckey and Ritter write 
that “by strategically wielding human rights throughout his presidency and by using human 
rights to amplify his use of association and dissociation, Bush connects his actions in important 
ways to the foundational myths of American Democracy.”77 They posit that President Bush used 
human rights as a way to affirm the American identity as the frontrunner of liberty and by doing 
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so, reinforce American exceptionalism. However, in doing so, the United States managed to 
subvert its own political identity by approaching the Iraq War from a human rights standpoint.  
The Iraq War has not been remembered for its liberation of Saddam’s regime or 
providing freedom for the Iraqi people, but rather images of torture and waterboarding at the 
hands of the American Military, detainees at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and the ever 
growing institutionalization of Islamophobia. What has been remembered is the danger in 
equating human rights with state power and the tools used to create a decade long war.  
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3. Iraq as a “Humanitarian War” 
 
 
The Iraq War has been characterized as a neoconservative war – one which was 
engineered in order to promote democracy in the Middle East. Some are quick to forget, 
however, how human rights played an integral role for many in regards to starting the war. The 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 passed the Senate 
without amendment on October 11, 2002. It became public law on October 16th. In the Senate, 
the bill received 77 yes votes, 29 of which were Democrats. Yes votes came from senators such 
as Hillary Clinton, former Secretary of State John Kerry, and current Senate Minority Leader 
Chuck Schumer.78 Regime change in Iraq was necessary, they thought. It was also imminent. 
The case for war, however, was not just made by neoconservatives. To many, fighting the Iraq 
War was necessary on humanitarian grounds.  
 
Left Leaning Arguments for Humanitarian Intervention 
Conversations surrounding humanitarianism and Iraq can be approached through three 
different methods. The first is through a philosophical lens – focusing on intellectual points 
surrounding the Saddam regime. The second focuses on humanitarianism through a political 
lens, in which human rights play a role in intervention for the benefit of the state intervening. 
Lastly, humanitarianism can be rights oriented and determined to provide a service to a group 
that needs it. All three of these were tackled by intellectuals and politicians in determining 
whether or not Iraq should be invaded on a humanitarian basis.  
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 Christopher Hitchens, a notable leftist and contrarian was an intellectual who heavily 
advocated for the Iraq War on humanitarian grounds. In his essay, “The Case for Regime 
Change,” Hitchens lays out specific reasons for the need for military action in Iraq. First, he 
writes that the United States should invade because of “The beggaring of the infrastructure, the 
immiseration of the society, with the regime’s own turn to opportunism Islamism, presented the 
international community with the real possibility of an imploded Iraq, riven by sectarian 
differences and with a new lumpen underclass at the mercy of demagogy.”79 The civilians, 
Hitchens argues, were in need for release from the brutal rule of Saddam Hussein. His rule had 
led to the effective breakdown of the state as a whole; infrastructure as well as society were 
crumbling. 
For Hitchens, Iraq was presenting itself as a state close to failure. He outlines the 
difference between rogue states and failed states, and posits that without intervention, Iraq would 
soon become a failed state. His first point echoes that of Robert Kagan and William Kristol, as 
he writes, “Clearly, a superpower like the United States, and the world community in general, 
has several kinds of interest in preventing the occurrence of state failure. The first is obvious 
enough: it is something worse than callous to witness such developments as a spectator.”80 This 
echoes their essay, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” regarding their sentiments as the 
United States as a bystander to global atrocities and human rights violations. The United States 
has the means to prevent and react to such – and can not herald itself as a champion of human 
rights as it watches a dictator torture his nation.  
Second, Hitchens aims at the consequences of a failed state. He writes that “state failure 
or implosion may involve actual or attempted genocide, which nations signed to the Geneva 
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Convention are sworn to prevent and to punish.”81 The United States, is of course, signed to the 
Geneva Convention. For Hitchens, it is important to intervene now as Iraq teeters on the edge of 
a rogue state, before Iraq fails and the United States must make measures to stop an active 
genocide or attempted genocide. Hitchens invokes Rwanda as a failed state that led to genocide 
and remarks that it would be in the United States best interest to prevent an atrocity such as that 
again. 
Third, Hitchens argues that a failed state has ramifications for the region as a whole, not 
just the state itself. He writes that “state failure often drags neighboring countries into a “black 
hole.”82 The failure of Iraq would see other Middle Eastern countries affected by civil war or 
conflict, such as the displacement of Iraqis and a refugee crisis. Hitchens also uses the example 
of the genocide in Rwanda leading to civil war in the Congo. Bringing other countries in the 
region to violence would only increase the likelihood of a United States intervention, with many 
more lives lost and much more rebuilding to do. In the interest of time, it would be the best 
decision to intervene before Iraq had fully devolved into a failed state. 
The last point Hitchens makes is that Saddam Hussein had been a serious threat to the 
region for some time. Hussein gained power in the 1970’s, used sarin gas on the Kurds in the 
1980’s, invaded Kuwait in the 1990’s, and supported Al Qaeda’s mission in the early 2000’s. 
Hitchens writes that “Saddam Hussein was not a newly invented enemy. He was one of the 
oldest foes, not just of the United States but of international norms. If he was not, in the 
vernacular of the argument, an “imminent” threat, he was certainly a permanent and serious 
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one.”83 According to Hitchens, it made sense for the United States to invade Iraq in hopes of 
changing the regime – for the betterment of the Iraqi people and the region as a whole. 
Hitchens represents the philosophical side of approaching humanitarianism. While he is 
invested in the rights of the Iraqi people and the effects of the Saddam regime, he concludes his 
point through an abstract set of hypotheticals. Hitchens is excited by the failings of the regime 
and what it might come to mean in the long term. His method is prediction based on historical 
context and fact, analyzed through a what-if scenario.  
 An important politician who felt the same way as Christopher Hitchens was Tony Blair, 
the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. In a speech to the House of Commons, Blair publicly 
advocated for the removal of Saddam Hussein from power on humanitarian grounds. First, Blair 
appealed to the detriments of the economic situation in Iraq. In his speech, he stated that Iraq was 
impoverished, with “60% of its population dependent on Food Aid. Thousands of children die 
needlessly every year from lack of food and medicine. Four million people out of a population of 
just 20 million are in exile.”84  In a state that was heading for failure, the economic situation 
would only proceed to get worse. Blair argued that the state of Iraq was in a humanitarian crisis, 
and that it was the job of a coalition led by the United States to intervene in hopes of restoring a 
comfortable state of living for the Iraqi people. 
 Blair did not shy away from blasting the Hussein regime for their human rights abuses, as 
well. Hussein was responsible for the current economic situation in Iraq while simultaneously 
abusing citizens by violating their social and civil rights. Blair spoke to the “brutality of the 
repression” of the Hussein regime, saying “the death and torture camps, the barbaric prisons for 
political opponents, the routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of disloyalty – are 
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well documented. Just last week, someone slandering Saddam was tied to a lamp post in a street 
in Baghdad, his tongue cut out, mutilated and left to bleed to death, as a warning to others.”85 
Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who violated many international laws and the United 
Kingdom was more than willing to depose him through military force, along with the United 
States of America. 
 Tony Blair went on, referencing the freedom those in Great Britain experienced and the 
pleasures the citizens enjoyed. Iraqi citizens were not so lucky, he argued. “We take our freedom 
for granted. But imagine not to be able to speak or discuss or debate or even question the society 
you live in. To see friends and family taken away and never daring to complain. To suffer the 
humility of failing courage in face of pitiless terror. That is how the Iraqi people live. Leave 
Saddam in place and that is how they will continue to live,”86 he said. What the Iraqi people were 
missing was the benefits bestowed upon the citizens of democracy. Without democracy, Iraqi 
citizens had no liberty or freedom. Without the democracy enjoyed by states like Great Britain or 
the United States, Iraq was devoid of human rights. 
 Blair represents the political side of approaching humanitarianism. His speech to the 
British House of Commons had the intent of persuasion. Blair was advocating for the toppling of 
the Saddam regime and invoking human rights in order to emphasise the necessity. Blair’s 
speech was a political act, aided and abetted by the utilization of human rights language. Later in 
his speech, Blair references past incidents with Saddam Hussein and the only way in which 
Saddam listened to international pressure. “What changed his mind?” Blair asks? “The threat of 
                                               
85 Cushman, Thomas. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq. 
86 Cushman, Thomas. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq. 
 
 
41 
 
force.”87 With this it becomes clear that Blair’s goal is military intervention in Iraq with 
humanitarianism as a leading political cause. 
 The need for military intervention is echoed by Thomas Cushman into his book, “A 
Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for the War in Iraq.” The book, comprised of 
many essays by left leaning thinkers advocating for the war in Iraq based on humanitarian 
values, presents an insightful image of Saddam Hussein and his ferocious rule. The introduction, 
written by Cushman, lays an outline for the rest of the book, detailing exactly how important the 
removal of Saddam from power was. Cushman writes on Saddam, “For more than three decades, 
his crimes against humanity, wars of aggression, support of international terrorism, and volatility 
as a destabilizing force were tolerated, aided, and abetted by world powers and the international 
community for the sake of political expediency, stability, and material interests.”88 Here, 
Cushman’s thinking falls directly in line with Christopher Hitchens. Saddam Hussein was by no 
means a new enemy to the United States of America, or world for that matter. He was, however, 
consistent in his attempts to violate international law and commit human rights abuses. 
 Cushman also understands the human rights from a perspective that isn’t rooted in 
American politics. His voice, along with the voices in his book, are important because they 
represent a different set of human rights than neoconservatives do. Cushman is less focused on 
the United States of America, and more focused on how Saddam Hussein affected the Iraqi 
people. Cushman writes that “coming to the rescue and aid of a people who had been subjected 
to decades of brutality and crimes against humanity is entirely consistent with the basic liberal 
principle of solidarity with the oppressed and the fundamental humanitarian principle of 
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rescue.”89 Humanitarian intervention for the purpose of establishing a democracy is not what 
Cushman is writing about. He is writing that the state of Iraq falls well within the parameters of a 
humanitarian intervention on basic principles. It was the United States’ duty to protect the people 
of Iraq because they could.  
 Cushman then goes on to invoke human rights language that all members of advocacy 
work and human rights work understand easily. He writes that “The war can be seen as morally 
legitimate on grounds of basic human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which is the ethical basis for the international world order.”90 By referencing the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Cushman is distinctly stating that the state of Iraq was 
experiencing human rights atrocities that needed to be addressed, in a language that all 
politicians or non-governmental human rights workers could understand. This, is approaching 
humanitarianism through a rights-centered lens. Cushman is advocating for the use of military 
force strictly for the means of helping the Iraqi people. 
 
Paul Wolfowitz and Iraq 
 The war in Iraq was undoubtedly fought on humanitarian grounds, and should have been 
for many, conservatives and democrats alike. The war, however, was pushed by 
neoconservatives for other reasons. Paul Wolfowitz, a noted neoconservative and Deputy 
Secretary of Defense for the Bush Administration made this clear with the infamous 1992 
“Defense Planning Guidance,” known to many as the Wolfowitz Doctrine. The document, which 
was lampooned and ultimately rewritten, focused heavily on American exceptionalism and how 
the United States could benefit from other regions around the world. 
                                               
89 Cushman, Thomas. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq. 
90 Cushman, Thomas. A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq. 
 
 
43 
 
The first mention of the Middle East has nothing to do with a national defence strategy. 
Rather, Wolfowitz saw fit to characterize the Middle East as most importantly an economic 
opportunity for the United States. He writes, “In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall 
objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western 
access to the region’s oil.”91 First and foremost, Wolfowitz makes it clear that the United States’s 
relationship with the Middle East should be one of power and control. “Remaining the 
predominant outside power” is the first thing he mentions. This shows a knowledge of other 
“outside powers” in the region, and a competitiveness to outlast these other states. Secondly, 
Wolfowitz states directly that the United States must preserve their access to oil. In this 
document, there is no call to human rights or interest in the well being of the people of the 
Middle East. It is about how interactions with Middle Eastern countries can benefit the United 
States of America.  
 Wolfowitz goes on, again placing heavy emphasis on how to protect American benefits 
by creating peace. He places an emphasis on sustaining regional stability, presumably in order to 
maintain the relationship between the United States and Middle Eastern oil. Wolfowitz writes, 
“We also seek to deter further aggression in the region, foster regional stability, protect US 
nationals and property, and safeguard our access to international air and seaways.”92 The same 
can be said about “deterring further aggression in the region.” Wolfowitz’s main goal is to create 
a Middle East that continues to supply the United States with oil. Here, however, Wolfowitz 
outlines other goals. He also places importance on “protecting US nationals and property,” as 
well as safeguarding access to international air and seaways.  
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Lastly, Wolfowitz makes the claim that specific states uniting in the Middle East will 
conclude with detrimental outcomes for other states. He specifically mentions Iraq in a tone that 
purports “bad for business.” He writes, “As demonstrated by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, it 
remains fundamentally important to prevent a hegemon or alignment of powers from dominating 
the region. This pertains especially to the Arabian peninsula. Therefore, we must continue to 
play a strong role through enhanced deterrence and improved cooperative security.”93 Wolfowitz 
is interested in keeping the Middle East sentient. In his ideal world, the Middle East will remain 
un-united while simultaneously continuing to flow oil to the United States and the rest of the 
Western world. The only unity Wolfowitz wishes for is a rallying around American interests. 
Once the war had started, Wolfowitz had no problem invoking human rights in reference 
to the good the United States was doing in Iraq. A 2003 news article from the American Forces 
Press Service reported that “Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz urged Iraqi women's and 
human rights group representatives here today to continue their hard work and dedication ‘to 
make sure Iraq becomes a free country.’”94 Wolfowitz was quoted while visiting Fatima al-Zahra 
Center for Women's Rights in Hilla, a town south of Baghdad. Wolfowitz praised the center, 
which had become the first Center focused around vocational training for women who had been 
widowed or were living in poverty. In speaking more, Wolfowitz directly correlates rights with 
democracy, stating that "The key to preventing another dictator is to participate in the political 
process and to work to ensure that all people's rights are protected."95 Here, he creates the 
distinction between a dictatorship and free democracy. His mentioning of preventing “another 
dictator” hinges upon securing rights for the citizens of Iraq. By providing disadvantaged women 
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with vocational training, the women are empowered toward economic independence. As such, 
these women are much more likely to engage with the “political process” Wolfowitz mentions. 
He acknowledges that the United States is improving the lives of individuals while 
simultaneously laying the foundation for democracy – rights.  
Only a month before his visit to Hilla, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz was 
speaking at a forum hosted by the New Yorker magazine at the New School University. His 
focus: defend the Bush Administration’s foreign policy to a largely anti-war, liberal audience. 
After being met with hisses and boos upon his introduction, as well as a man who rushed the 
stage and was carried out by security, Wolfowitz reminded those in attendance that “all that 
Iraqis were also now enjoying the right of free speech.”96 Retort aside, much of Wolfowitz’s talk 
revolving around the reasons for invading Iraq centered around a concern for human rights. As 
written by the New York Times, “The United States waged war for three reasons, he said: the 
concern over Iraq's drive to obtain chemical, biological and nuclear weapons; Iraq's connections 
to terrorism; and Mr. Hussein's reign of terror that Mr. Wolfowitz said was responsible for 
perhaps a million Iraqi deaths.”97 Before the United States intervened, Wolfowitz stated that Iraq 
was “a human rights nightmare.”98 
 The human rights rhetoric used by Wolfowitz in regards to Hilla and his conservation in 
New York are a stark contrast to his pre-war rhetoric regarding Iraq, as early as the 1970’s. 
David Milne writes in his piece “Intellectualism in US Diplomacy: Paul Wolfowitz and His 
Predecessors” that Wolfowitz had his eyes on regime change in Iraq thirty years before the Iraq 
War. He writes, “In the late 1970s, an ambitious young Pentagon analyst named Paul Dundes 
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Wolfowitz identified Iraq as a likely future threat to American interests. A trained political 
scientist and ardent anti-communist, Wolfowitz distrusted the ruthless Saddam Hussein and 
thought him susceptible to Soviet influence.”99 This directly reflects neoconservative sentiment 
and the policy of containment adopted by the United States during the Cold War. Wolfowitz was 
keen on deposing Saddam because he felt the dictator as a threat to American ideals and saw 
Saddam as likely to be impacted by communism. Wolfowitz believed Saddam to be a threat 
because of his lack of democratic values. 
 Milne argues that Wolfowitz understood that Saddam’s despotism couldn’t be reason 
enough for United States involvement in Iraq. Instead he took a different approach, forming “a 
radical theory that the Middle East represented fertile ground on which to plant American-style 
values. He concluded that this oil-rich, Muslim-majority region would embrace westernization 
and that Israel represented a beacon of sort.”100 Wolfowitz believed that because Israel had 
adopted American style democratic values, the rest of the Middle Eastern region was susceptible 
to the same. In doing so, Wolfowitz would be ridding the region of a dictator he believed easily 
influenceable by the Soviet Union while simultaneously spreading democracy to a state rich with 
oil reserves.  
 Wolfowitz saw his views validated as the United States invaded Iraq in August of 1990. 
He was livid, however, when instead of deposing Saddam, the United States withdrew forces 
without regime change. Milne writes that “In February 1998, he testified before a congressional 
committee that the ‘best opportunity to overthrow Saddam was lost in the month after the war.’ 
He viewed the president's decision to reject nation-building in Iraq as narrow-minded and 
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concluded that he lacked moral fibre.”101 For Wolfowitz, a failure to promote democracy in Iraq 
is a failure to spread liberty and freedom, or a failure to share the American values with Iraqis 
that best represent human rights to the United States. This human rights rhetoric is vastly 
different than the rhetoric used by Wolfowitz regarding Hilla. 
What Wolfowitz and other neoconservatives viewed as an opportunity to expand 
democratic freedom, President George H. W. Bush saw as an uncalled for attempt at promoting 
democracy in a foreign region that would cost American lives. In regards to criticism levied at 
him by Wolfowitz, Bush responded, "Whose life would be on my hands as the commander-in-
chief because I, unilaterally, went beyond the international law, went beyond the stated mission, 
and said we're going to show that we're macho? We're going into Baghdad. We're going to be an 
occupying power - America in an Arab land - with no allies at our side. It would have been 
disastrous."102 Here, Bush is sidelining the notion that as a superpower, it is the job of the United 
States to correct the shortcomings of the Saddam regime. Bush isn’t concerned with exercising 
authority because the United States can. For him, deposing Saddam because the United States 
was physically capable was “macho” and unthoughtful.  
Wolfowitz, however, saw this as well worth the price of establishing a democratic 
country in the Middle East. Milne writes that “Wolfowitz thought that America was better placed 
than any other nation to give Iraq a gentle nudge in the direction of liberty. The birth-pangs of 
democracy are not edifying, but this self-assured Pentagon staffer believed that the human costs 
of war were well worth paying.”103 The Iraq War would be come to known as much more than a 
“gentle nudge in the direction of liberty” as it claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqi 
civilians, as well as the lives of thousands of United States soldiers.  
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 Wolfowitz demonstrates a clear change of tone regarding the Iraq War in his pre rhetoric 
and post invasion rhetoric in respect to human rights. His characterization of Saddam and his 
quest for democracy in Iraq can be described as a neoconservative looking to spread American 
values as a form of human rights is drastically different than the human rights language he used 
following the invasion of Iraq. As the United States fought the war, Wolfowitz shifted from 
democracy to language centered around the rights of oppressed people and how to protect those 
rights and ensure that they would be protected in the future.  
 The post invasion rhetoric used by Paul Wolfowitz can be aptly compared to the pre war 
rhetoric used by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Both were centered around the promotion of 
human rights in an area particularly affected by oppression for political purposes. Blair was 
advocating for the invasion, as Wolfowitz was validating it. Visits like Wolfowitz’s to Hilla were 
political in nature – his presence was an affirmation of the work he believed the United States to 
be doing. His presence was to show that the United States was committed to creating a pro 
human rights sentiment in Iraq by creating a new and bountiful democracy. 
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Conclusion 
  
The Iraq War formally ended in December of 2011. The United States looks back now 
and regards the war as a failure. In what was believed to be a quick war to depose Saddam and 
establish a democratic government, the war in Iraq took eight years to complete. As the United 
States withdrew, a power vacuum erupted and the Islamic State rose to power, starting a horrific 
civil war.  
 The experiment had failed. The mission to promote democracy in Iraq left Americans 
with regret for the war as a whole. Many politicians, including Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis regarded the Iraq war as a mistake.104 Neoconservative ideology had been a failure in the 
eyes of the American people. In his New York Times article titled “After Neoconservatism,” 
Francis Fukuyama wrote, “But it is the idealistic effort to use American power to promote 
democracy and human rights abroad that may suffer the greatest setback.”105 With the election of 
our newest President, the American people are starting to understand that. 
 President Donald Trump represents the antithesis of neoconservatism. His policies of 
“America First” are vastly different than those of the Reagan Administration. The Iraq War was 
fought based on an ideology that creating a democratic Middle East would be better for the 
people as well as the whole world. President Trump effectively has no foreign policy other than 
placing the needs of the American people above the rest of the world. He is not looking for 
monsters to destroy, but rather focusing on domestic issues.  
 So where have the neoconservatives gone? The 2016 presidential election left Americans 
believing that Hillary Clinton was a neoconservative as she was endorsed by the likes of Robert 
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Kagan. Kagan said of Clinton in 2014, “I feel comfortable with her on foreign policy ... If she 
pursues a policy which we think she will pursue, it’s something that might have been called 
neocon, but clearly her supporters are not going to call it that; they are going to call it something 
else.”106 Kagan even went so far to host a fundraiser for Clinton which garnered upwards of 
$25,000 for her campaign. 
 There is no doubt that the Trump presidency has flipped party lines – in large part thanks 
to his isolationist foreign policy. Curiously enough, Elliott Abrams was being considered for 
Assistant Secretary of State but was ultimately “nixed from the list of contenders after President 
Donald Trump learned of Abrams' biting criticism last May of his fitness to become president.” 
Why would an isolationist like Donald Trump wish to have a neoconservative in the second 
highest rank of the State Department, essentially creating foreign policy? Most would argue that 
it was because Abrams had years of foreign policy experience while Trump and his newly 
appointed Secretary of State had a combined zero.  
 Neoconservatives continue to shape thought, just not from inside the United States 
government. Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, a think tank based in Washington D.C. Paul Wolfowitz is now a visiting scholar at the 
American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank based in Washington D.C. Robert Kagan 
is a senior fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy at the Brookings Institute, 
which is – you guessed it – a think tank based in Washington D.C. 
 Where does this leave interventionist humanitarian foreign policy in the future? While the 
Trump Administration boasts an isolationist foreign policy, Paul Wolfowitz described his 
outlook on Trump as “optimistic” after a missile strike in Syria in retaliation for the Syrian 
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government’s use of chemical weapons on civilians. “I think there is a fantastic opportunity here. 
It’s only a first step, it’s only an opportunity,”107 Said Wolfowitz, while including that he hopes 
the Trump Administration will follow up with more, harsher military action. It is highly unlikely, 
however, that after the failures in Iraq, the United States would take it upon itself to depose the 
Assad regime in Syria in hopes of establishing a democracy. The future of the United States 
intervening in international conflicts for the reason of democracy promotion is indeed uncertain. 
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